Pelagius was a monk of British origin who was teaching
in Rome
at the beginning of the fifth century. When Rome came under barbarian
attack in 410, he fled to North Africa,
and from there made his way to the East, where his views stirred up controversy
in Palestine.
He eventually found refuge in Constantinople,
though his ultimate fate is unknown. He was condemned at the first council of Ephesus in 431,
but it is not certain that he was still alive at that time. Long before that,
however, Augustine (354-430) had become aware of Pelagius's
teaching and the unsettling effect that it was having in North
Africa. He wrote no fewer than fifteen treatises
against it, and was a prominent voice in the condemnation of Pelagius's views at Carthage in 418.
Unfortunately, virtually all we know about the debates between Pelagius and
Augustine comes from these treatises, and we are forced to infer Pelagius's position from what Augustine says about it. On
the other hand, much of the debate between the two men was conducted on a
courteous level (particularly during the early stages of the controversy), and
there is no reason to suppose that Augustine deliberately misquoted his
opponent. Pelagius comes across as a forceful speaker with a great ability to
sway his audience, but Augustine scores more highly on substance. It seems most
likely that many people were led astray by Pelagius's
oratorical gifts, and that it was only later, when some of his hearers began to
reflect more deeply on his teachings, that disquiet arose.
Both Augustine and Pelagius argued their case from the
Bible, and in particular from the Pauline Epistles. They both agreed that God
had created mankind with free will, and that it was only by divine grace that
anyone could, or would, be saved. The differences between them lay within these
parameters. Pelagius believed that it was possible for people to do genuinely
good things if they wished to, and that God would reward them for their
efforts. He insisted that every person faces a real choice between good and
evil, since if that were not so, God would have to be regarded as the author of
evil, as well as of good, and the human will would have no significance of its
own. He did not intend by this to deny the grace of God, since it was that
which gave man free will in the first place, and it seems most likely that he
regarded the will as created in an unformed, weak state that had to be nurtured
by God's law. The key point is that, just as the gospel can only be received by
people old enough to understand it, so sin can be committed only by those who
know what they are doing. There is, therefore, no sinfulness inherent in every
human being from birth, and no guilt that is passed on from one generation to
the next. For Pelagius, the idea that no one could choose to do good without
particular divine intervention enabling that choice smacked of injustice and
arbitrariness on God's part, and so he rejected it.
Augustine, on the other hand, insisted that the sin of
Adam was so great that it touched every aspect of human nature, and was passed
on from one generation to the next. No amount of willing on anyone's part can
produce works that are acceptable to God, because the root problem lies deeper
than that. Human beings have been alienated from their Creator in such a way
they cannot claim moral neutrality in any sphere. Even if they should do things
that other people would generally recognize as good, these things would still
be tainted by the basic sinfulness which affects us all.
Augustine believed that God's grace was needed not to
improve or increase human capacities for doing good,
but in order to transform the human condition from one of sinfulness to one of
obedience. To the Pelagian notion that the will is
weak and needs instruction, Augustine answered that the will knows perfectly
well what it should be doing but lacks the power to do it. Pelagius never
grasped the Apostle Paul's frustration on this point, which he expressed so
eloquently in Romans 7. Furthermore, argued Augustine, Pelagius had never come
to terms with the true horror of death. Even if it were true that some people
can advance in the spiritual life and rise higher up the scale of virtue than
others, these people must still die-and there is no guarantee that their deaths
will be any less painful than anyone else's. The universality of death, which
touches infants as well as adults, can only be explained by the universality of
sin, which also touches children. Ignorance of the law is not the same as innocence
and children are perfectly capable of sinning without understanding what they
are doing. To imagine otherwise, says Augustine, is not only to fly in the face
of obvious facts, it is to make God unjust for bringing death to morally
ignorant children when they had done nothing to deserve it.
It is easy to see why Pelagius's
arguments appealed to many people when they first heard them, but it is also
not difficult to understand why Augustine won the argument between them. His
understanding of human nature and of the justice of God was more logical and
more profound than that of Pelagius, for whom sin was
a willful act, not a state of being caused by a
broken relationship with God. It was also more humane, because those who are
saved know that this is because of God's grace, and does not depend on their
own erratically good behavior. A sinner saved by
grace has peace with God, whereas a person trying to do the right thing for
God's sake will always be full of anxiety and never have peace. This is the
gospel, and it was Augustine, not Pelagius, who expressed it more faithfully in
the end.
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